Strategic theory and the history of war by Moran, Daniel
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2002
Strategic theory and the history of war
Moran, Daniel
Moran, Daniel. "Strategic theory and the history of war." Strategy in the
Contemporary World (2002): 18.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/61184
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
STRATEGIC THEORY AND THE HISTORY OF WAR
DANIEL MORAN
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
• Introduction: The Organization of Violence
• The Art of War in the Age of Reason
• Clausewitz and the Modernization of War
• Beyond the Battlefield: Sea Power
• Imagining Armageddon: Air Power
• Total War, People’s War, and the Crisis of Theory
© Copyright Daniel Moran, 2001. All rights reserved.
1
This essay surveys the development of strategic the-
ory from its emergence in the seventeenth century through
the era of the world wars. Although the focus is on ideas,
some account is taken of changing historical circumstances
against which strategic thought has unfolded. The goal of
theory in any field is to improve our understanding of re-
ality, and our ability to act effectively. In the case of stra-
tegic theory, the interaction between thought and action is
especially intense, because war is such an unforgiving en-
terprise, and because, until recently, serious thinking about
how war should be conducted has been confined for the
most part to those responsible for waging it. Before the
advent of nuclear weapons, the work of theory in the mili-
tary field was almost exclusively the concern of practitio-
ners. Most have proceeded by way of historical inference,
scrutinizing recent (and occasionally remote) experience in
search of an underlying logic capable of explaining events.
The result is a body of work displaying substantial intel-
lectual continuity, despite much intervening technological
and social change; but one whose basic outlook would
eventually be called into question by the advent of nuclear
weapons on the one hand, and by the rising prominence of
guerilla insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of irregular
warfare on the other.
Introduction: The Organization of Violence
Strategic theory is the branch of social theory con-
cerned with the use of force to achieve the goals of one
community in conflict with others. It aims at a systematic
understanding of how to employ armed forces to advance
political, social, economic, cultural, or ideological inter-
ests. War’s instrumental nature – its logical and practical
subordination to objectives outside itself – is in theoretical
terms its most important characteristic. The first step in
strategic analysis, as Napoleon said, is to ask “What is the
war about?” Absent an answer – or, alternatively, if the
proposed answer is “Nothing” – war becomes a maze of
atavistic bloodshed that can only be discussed in technical
terms. It is because war is an organized social enterprise
that strategy, which is the calculated application of collec-
tive violence for some ulterior purpose, becomes both pos-
sible and necessary.
The most famous assertion of war's status as a means
occurs in Carl von Clausewitz's On War, where war is
identified as “a political instrument, a continuation of po-
litical activity by other means” – politics being defined,
elsewhere in the same work, as the “trustee” and “repre-
sentative of all the interests of the community.”1 It must be
emphasized, however, that Clausewitz's originality as a
theorist does not derive from his identification of war as a
political instrument, but rather from his insistence that
politics permeates all levels of military action. In itself, the
notion that war is a function of politics was already com-
                                                 
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1976), 87, 606-7.
monplace, as symbolized by the practice, popularized by
Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642), of casting the words Ul-
tima Ratio — “the final argument” — into the barrels of
cannon. This view of war has predominated throughout the
modern era: war is “the final argument of kings,” as Rich-
elieu would have said; and if there are no kings, then of
states and nations.
Part of what is worth noting about this idea is how
easily its acceptance can relegate war to the margins of
political theory. War does not loom large in the work of
John Locke, or Montesquieu, or David Hume, or John
Stuart Mill, or (with some qualification) Karl Marx. On the
contrary, the dominant issue in Western political thought
has always been how to organize and legitimize power
within communities. That such communities would fight
with each other was obvious, but difficult to grasp analyti-
cally, because the contest was so chaotic. Most writers
were content to follow Locke (and Thomas Hobbes before
him) in envisioning the international arena as akin to the
state of nature, lacking, in Locke's parlance, a “common
judge” whose authority was recognized by everyone.2 War
served as a place-holder for the missing judge. At the same
time, its cruel and arbitrary character illustrated what life
outside organized politics was like. When Clausewitz
wrote in the 1820s that the natural element of war was
chance, he was to some extent echoing a well-established
understanding of where war fit into the larger scheme of
things.
The reasons why governments and individuals might
venture into the chaos of war have always been subject to
moral scrutiny. The literature on the justice of war, and of
just conduct in war, is both more extensive and more im-
pressive intellectually than that on how war can be fought
most effectively. Questions of justice and morality have
impinged but little upon strategic theory, not because
military theorists are necessarily indifferent to humanity,
but because such external forces lie beyond the scope of
their work.
It must be recognized that Napoleon’s question, how-
ever useful as a starting-point, is deceptive in suggesting
that, once war’s purposes have been identified, its reality
becomes easier to grasp. This is only marginally true.
Compare, for instance, “What is Hamlet about?” There is
no reasonably direct reply to this question – “revenge,”
maybe, or “betrayal” – that will not strike anyone familiar
with Shakespeare’s play as naïve. Knowing that Hamlet
feels betrayed, and is bent upon revenge, explains only a
small number of his actions, and then only partially. Ham-
let’s fate is determined by psychological and cultural
forces that are remote from his conscious purposes, and
beyond his cognitive reach – or Shakespeare’s, for that
                                                 
2 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government [1689-1704],
chapter 3: “Of the State of War,” in Two Treatises of Govern-
ment, edited by Peter Laslett, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1967), 278-82.
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matter, though Shakespeare’s knowledge of Hamlet must
be as close to God-like as one can imagine.
In the end, the question “What is Hamlet about?” is
more likely to inspire an impatient groan than a firm an-
swer. War is much the same, decidedly so in the case of
intense or protracted conflicts whose effects react upon
society as a whole. As in Hamlet, most of what happens in
war is driven by unique or contingent circumstances: cul-
tural or institutional preferences, economic resources, geo-
graphic facts, ethnic animosities, and so on, many of which
are poorly understood by the participants. The ability of
theory to explain or incorporate such influences is limited.
There are any number of instances in which it is perfectly
clear that a belligerent’s strategy arises directly from its
military capabilities, refracted by habit: as often as not,
you just do what you can, regardless of what course of
action may be deemed optimal in theory.
Still, the impact of theory upon practice has not been
negligible, either. Although writers on war are sometimes
too ready to impute exaggerated importance to books – as
if senior commanders or, indeed, whole nations, have al-
tered their military outlook as a consequence of reading
Clausewitz or Mahan – the tendency of modern military
organizations to resemble each other testifies to the or-
ganizing power of ideas. The contemporary armies of (to
take a few representative examples) China, France, Brazil,
Egypt, and the United States, all resemble each other more
than they do the armies of their ancestors because, despite
all cultural differences, they share a common understand-
ing of the basic character and use of military force. That
understanding is rooted in intellectual developments that
occurred in Europe and America over the last three hun-
dred years.
The force structures, weapons’ systems, and fighting
methods of good armies in the seventeenth century – the
period when the systematic study of war first gains impor-
tance – were markedly more diverse and idiosyncratic than
they would be later on. A number of factors contributed to
this convergence, including the development of new tech-
nologies, and the progressive social and economic integra-
tion of Europe (and, eventually, of its colonial hinterlands).
The exemplary achievements of France during the Revo-
lutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) and of Prussia
during the Wars of German Unification (1864-71) also
played a part, by establishing models of military excel-
lence for others to emulate. Yet it is also true that by then
the soldiers of the leading powers were already learning to
think about war along recognizably similar lines; and,
moreover, that the profession of arms had come to imply
not just personal courage and the right social position, but
distinctive intellectual preparation.
The Art of War in the Age of Reason
By the turn of the twentieth century, Western armies
had arrived at a common strategic vision that, subject to
modification in detail, would endure through the Second
World War. At its center lay a map, on which great armies
maneuvered against each other. All sought the same basic
end: to concentrate strong forces against weaker ones, by
exploiting favorable terrain, or by striking the enemy at a
place where he was inherently (or inadvertently) weak, or
at a time when he was poorly prepared.
Such possibilities were thought to exist even between
well-matched opponents because everything that fights on
land, from the individual soldier to the army of which he is
a part, is stronger on its front than on its flanks and rear;
stronger when it has its feet under it than when it is mov-
ing to a new position; and dependent upon logistical and
communications links that grow more vulnerable and less
efficient in proportion to their length. Strategy was essen-
tially a search for advantage among these facts. It was rec-
ognized that, given the firepower of modern armies, plus
the fact that all of them operated according to similar
methods, the likely result of combat between them was
stalemate, or perhaps some modest territorial gain, should
one side manage to drive back the other. True victory,
however – that is, victory capable of deciding great politi-
cal questions – required that the enemy’s forces be not just
repelled or reduced, but destroyed. Achieving this sort of
success was a matter of high professional skill, to which
civilians could make no contribution, either as political
overseers, or as irregular combatants, whose military po-
tential and legal rights were held in equal disregard.
This strategic consensus derived from the systematic
study of war that began in the wake of the early-modern
scientific revolution. War had, of course, been a subject of
intense thought since long before then. Any number of
works handed down from antiquity – the Iliad of Homer,
the histories of Thucydides, Tacitus, and Josephus,
Ceasar’s Commentaries – had treated war with much in-
sight. Yet the aim was not to develop a generalized under-
standing of how war should be conducted, but to com-
memorate great events, and inspire courage and virtue.
In antiquity and the Middle Ages war was studied in
historical terms, and as a craft, in which excellence was a
matter of practice and direct instruction. Military hand-
books and doctrinal works existed, but they were empirical
and antiquarian in character. The only one to survive intact
into modern times, Epitoma rei militaris by the fourth-
century Roman writer Vegetius, was a summary of tradi-
tional practices in such matters as drill, fortifications, dis-
cipline, and military administration.3 Vegetius’ work was
still being read by soldiers a thousand years later, which
may well justify its description, in the most recent Britan-
nica, as “perhaps the most influential military treatise in
the Western world.” Its longevity, however, is a tribute
less to its brilliance than to the absence of intellectual
competition. Even Machiavelli’s The Art of War (1521),
the most famous book on war produced during the Renais-
                                                 
3 See N. P. Milner, ed. and trans., Vegetius: Epitome of Military
Science (Liverpool, 1993).
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sance, is an attempt to recapture the wisdom of the an-
cients.4
Thereafter, however, a new military literature would
arise whose central impulse was analytic and systematic,
rather than descriptive. A variety of cultural influences
helped bring this about, above all the increasing prestige of
natural science as the preeminent form of human knowl-
edge. If nature would yield up its secrets to disciplined
inquiry, based upon a combination of close observation
and logical reasoning, there was no reason human affairs
should not as well. Viewed in this light war, along with
politics, economics, law, and so on, might become some-
thing like a scientific enterprise.
This new intellectual orientation was given an addi-
tional push, in the military sphere, by institutional changes
known collectively as the “military revolution.” Its com-
ponents included the displacement of cavalry by infantry
as the most important formation on the battlefield; the in-
troduction of firearms; the development of fortifications
capable of withstanding prolonged bombardment by artil-
lery; and, above all, the establishment of standing armies
much larger than the feudal levies, urban militias, and
mercenary bands of the past. Waging war with such tools
required more than courage, common sense, and a firm
seat on a horse. Some theory about how to proceed was
required, and it was the generals of the new-model armies
who would provide it.
One of the first to attempt a systematic account of
how to fight in the new conditions was Raimondo de
Montecuccoli (1609-80), a field marshal of the Austrian
Habsburgs renowned for his skill at maneuvering troops in
the field.5 As is usually the case in writing about warfare,
Montecuccoli’s views on issues such as the best ratio of
pikes to muskets, the proper way to organize a march, or
the maximum practicable size for a field army (50,000
men, already a low number when he was writing) have lost
their interest except to specialists. It is rather the general
structure of his ideas that has exerted enduring influence.
In his own day, Montecuccoli was known for having
declared that the sole objective of war was “victory” – a
seemingly unexceptionable claim, but a challenging one at
the time, because it elevated an illusive, and purely mili-
tary, abstraction above traditional, socially-defined con-
cerns with honor, glory, plunder, and prestige. Montecuc-
coli did not offer a categorical definition of what victory
                                                 
4 In Allan Gilbert, ed. and trans., Machiavelli: The Chief Works
and Others, 3 vols. (Durham and London, 1989), 2: 561-726.
5 Montecuccoli’s important works are Sulle battaglie [On Battle]
and Tratto della Guerra [Treatise on War] (1640-42); Dell’arte
militare [On the Art of War] (1649-54), and Della guerra col
Turco in Ungheria [On the War Against the Turks in Hungary]
(1670). Complete editions exist in French, German, and Italian,
but not English. There is a brief selection in Gérard Chaliand, ed.,
The Art of War in World History (Berkeley and London, 1994),
566-69.
entailed, though he said that “all possible means” might be
employed to achieve it. He was also insistent, at a time
when no government possessed anything like a general
staff or a military budget, that victory required intense
planning and preparation, and huge sums of money.
Montecuccoli, basing himself upon recent work in
international law, was the first military writer to draw a
systematic distinction between offensive and defensive
operations, and between international and civil war. The
latter contrast has proven especially critical, since, until
quite recently, strategic theory has been concerned exclu-
sively with international conflict, while taking undue com-
fort in the notion that other applications of military force
must follow the same patterns.6 Montecuccoli’s dismissal
of internal war as a subject for analysis represented a radi-
cal simplification of reality. The Europe in which he lived
was, and had been for over a century, a scene of continu-
ous and debilitating struggle, in which the perennial con-
test for preeminence between the French monarchy and the
Habsburg Empire had blended seamlessly with civil wars,
peasant uprisings, and religious strife of every description.
Montecuccoli wrote not to capture this reality, but to over-
come it. The goal of theory, for him and nearly all his suc-
cessors, was not to systematize the full range of forms that
social conflict might take, but to cut through them, and so,
by exerting intellectual mastery, to achieve better practical
control. Strategy would be the box within which the vio-
lence of war would be contained.
Most of Montecuccoli’s work is taken up by opera-
tional maxims, expressed in an aphoristic style that would
be much imitated, as the appropriate way to report the re-
sults of scientific inquiry.7 True knowledge, it seemed,
took the form of ideas sufficiently simple to be expressed
in a few sentences. The desire for simplicity, at least, is
understandable. Despite its self-confident didacticism, the
new military theory could not conceal the enormous diffi-
culty involved in assembling, moving, and feeding a mod-
ern army, whose mobility had not improved in proportion
to its size (and would not for another century and more).8
                                                 
6 Montecuccoli defined war as “the use of force or [sic] arms
against a foreign people or prince,” (Tratto della Guerra) in con-
trast to the violence a state might employ to control its own sub-
jects, or which they might use against it. In this he was following
the Dutch philosopher Justus Lipsius (Politicorum libri six [Six
Books of Politics], 1589), and echoing his contemporary, Hugo
Grotius (De Jure Belli ac Pacis [The Law of Peace and War],
1625), both of whom treat war as a sovereign act of the state.
7 The most famous among innumerable examples are the Rêveries
(1756-7) of the gifted French general Maurice de Saxe, a book so
pithy that some readers assumed it was a joke. An English trans-
lation is in Thomas R. Philips, ed., Roots of Strategy: A Collec-
tion of Military Classics (Harrisburg, Penn., 1955).
8 It is arguable that improvements in the mobility of land armies
never catch up with their increasing size and firepower. Although
internal combustion engines finally drive horses from the modern
battlefield, the actual speed with which large forces can move
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It was in understanding the motions of bodies in space that
contemporary science, from Galileo to Newton, had
achieved its greatest triumphs. Military theorists conceived
their own problems in similar terms.
The proposition that the secret to military success lay
in mastering the laws of motion and the rules of geometry
received telling expression in the work of a man best re-
membered for making the movement of armies more diffi-
cult: Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1643-1715), chief
military engineer to Louis XIV, and the person responsible
for laying out the fortress system that still guarded
France’s eastern frontier at the start of the First World
War.9 Vauban’s fortresses were examples of what are
sometimes called “star bastions” (properly traces itali-
ennes, after the country in which they first appeared).
Their outstanding feature is an intricate profusion of ar-
row-head-like structures protruding progressively from a
central core. Star bastions had replaced the curtain-walled
castles of the Middle Ages because they were equally re-
sistant to artillery and to attack by storm. The key, how-
ever, was precision in design. In the old days, the only
thing that mattered about a castle’s walls was that they be
high and thick. In modern fortresses, the complex angles of
the walls, required to deflect the penetrating round shot of
cannon, and the overlapping fields of fire created by the
intricate tracery of salients, traverses, ditches, glacis, rav-
elins, outworks, and so on, were all matters of exact
mathematical calculation, in which tactical issues were
resolved, quite literally, into engineering problems.
The same approach applied to the attack, where eve-
rything depended on the methodical elaboration of saps
and entrenchments which, if properly done, would finally
put the assailant in position to batter through a chosen spot
with minimal casualties of his own. All of this was ex-
pounded in Vauban’s work, which acquired enormous
reputation, despite its technical character, because sieges
were the characteristic military operations of that time –
far more common than pitched battles – and also because
modern siege-craft exemplified a disciplined approach to
fighting that contemporary commanders longed to apply to
the operations of armies in the field. If those operations
could be reduced to a similar system of linear relationships
and orderly procedures, war itself might become some-
thing like engineering. The need for actual violence would
be reduced, and replaced by patterns of maneuver whose
import would be apparent to both sides. Not for the last
time, there were some who imagined that, if war could be
                                                                                 
once they are in contact with each other did not change much
until quite recently. It took Hitler’s army longer to get from the
Vistula to Moscow than it took Napoleon’s; but then, it too
moved mainly on foot.
9 Vauban’s most important work was a compendium of three
essays written in 1704-6, in English as A Manual of Siegecraft
and Fortification, edited and translated by George A. Rothrock
(Ann Arbor, 1968).
subsumed within some mutually transparent strategic ra-
tionality, it would cease to be necessary at all. Strategy
would not merely organize the violence of war. It would
replace it.10
Military writing in the eighteenth century was mainly
an effort to apply the algebraic reasoning of siege-craft to
the conduct of maneuver warfare. It was an exercise that
fell short of the hopes invested in it – even the awkward,
slow-moving armies of the Old Regime were too full of
life to be treated like bricks and mortar – but nevertheless
produced insights of enduring importance. One had to do
with the synergistic effects of weapons. Armies of that era
were comprised of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, each of
which had strengths and weaknesses in relation to the oth-
ers. Each was also raised and trained separately from the
rest – a social more than a military fact, linked to the pre-
rogatives of an aristocratic officer corps and the weakness
of state finances, but a major barrier to military efficiency
just the same. The three “arms” moved at different speeds,
and were desperately vulnerable if required to fight alone
against the combined arms of the enemy. Bringing all three
together to good effect was a vexing problem, which was
solved by the development of new military formations –
later called “corps” and “divisions” – in which all arms
were combined in a single, integrated body large enough to
operate alone for extended periods.11
This new force structure eased the logistical difficul-
ties involved in keeping a large, concentrated force sup-
plied. An army subdivided into units small enough to live
off the territory through which it passed possessed a fun-
damental advantage over one tied to pre-positioned depots
by an endless chain of wagons. Once such independent
movements had been mastered, new forms for converging
attack became possible, as detached formations moved
toward the same battlefield – no easy thing given the mili-
tary communications of the day, but the wave of the future
none the less.
It was also recognized that, among all the imaginary
lines of movement and position that might be drawn on a
military map, the most critical was the one extending from
an army to what would now be called its “base,” the rear
area on which it relied for supplies, information, rein-
forcements, and so on. Because the army itself was the
chief means for defending the base, movement away from
it – that is, toward the enemy – was fraught with peril,
                                                 
10 It is not by chance that the first flourishing of strategic ration-
alism was accompanied by a new literature on “perpetual peace.”
Examples are Abbé Charles Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre, Projet
de paix perpétuelle [Project for a Perpetual Peace](Utrecht,
1713), and Jeremy Bentham, A Plan for a Universal and Perpet-
ual Peace (London, 1789).
11 The first systematic exposition of combined arms organization
is Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert, Essai général
de tactique [General Essay on Tactics] (Paris, 1772), though the
issue is anticipated in De Saxe’s Rêveries.
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which was perceived to grow not simply with distance, but
also as the angle formed by the line of the base and the line
of advance changed. This prepotent geometry became an
object of much contemplation, and led some to think they
knew, within a few degrees of arc, the moment at which
prudence gave way to folly and danger.12 If one sets such
spurious precision aside, however, along with the related
supposition that disrupting an adversary’s communications
is synonymous with defeating his army, there is no ques-
tion that the new emphasis on operations directed against
the enemy’s rear was of permanent importance.
More generally still, it is from the study of siege-craft
that soldiers gained new insight into the nature of victory:
that its central characteristic was not destruction, but dis-
ruption. A bastion falls not because every brick is torn
down, but because its structural integrity has been shat-
tered. “It is the same with strategy as with the siege of for-
tresses,” the young Napoleon observed. “Concentrate fire
on a single point: when the breach is made the equilibrium
is broken; all the rest becomes useless.”13 From there, it is
but a small step to Clausewitz’s still more comprehensive
observation, that in war “major successes help bring about
minor ones.”14
The climactic figure of the rationalist strategic tradi-
tion we have been discussing was Antoine-Henri de
Jomini.15 In biographical terms Jomini was a man of an-
other time. He was born in Switzerland in 1779, served as
a staff officer in Napoleon’s armies, and later rose to the
rank of general in the Russian service. His personal mili-
tary experience thus transcended that of the Old Regime;
and so did his writings, at least superficially.
Jomini was the preeminent interpreter of Napoleonic
warfare, in which incremental military innovations long
underway – in tactics, gun founding, logistics, map-
making, and so on – combined with the social and political
dynamism of the French Revolution to instill European
warfare with a decisiveness it had not previously pos-
sessed. Until the last years of his rule, Napoleon’s armies
were not remarkably larger than those of the past – his
                                                 
12 See especially Heinrich von Bülow, whose Geist des neuern
Kriegssystems [The Spirit of the Modern Military System] (Leip-
zig, 1799). Bülow proposed that the ideal military campaign
would involve two forces advancing from opposite ends of a
common base-line, so as to converge at an angle of no less than
ninety degrees.
13 Memorandum on future operations in Italy (1794), in Felix
Markham, Napoleon (New York, 1963), 27.
14 Unfinished note included with the manuscript of On War, in
Clausewitz, On War, 71
15 Jomini was a prolific and highly repetitive writer. Among doz-
ens of works, the most useful for a modern reader is his Précis de
l’art de la guerre [Summary of the Art of War], 2 vols. (Paris,
1838; rev. ed. 1855). There is an abridged edition in English,
Jomini and his Summary of the Art of War: A Condensed Ver-
sion, edited by J. D. Hittle (Harrisburg, Penn., 1947).
most brilliant campaign, culminating in the Battle of Aus-
terlitz in 1805, was accomplished with a total force of
about 200,000 men, of whom 75,000 were present at the
final battle. Nor were his battles bloodier, if one reckons
according to a soldier’s chance of becoming a casualty.
Napoleon’s battles were decidedly more numerous, how-
ever, and more consequential. It was these two facts above
all that impressed observers.
The increasing frequency with which Napoleon’s ar-
mies were able to fight was a result of the revolutionary
mobilization of French society, which included the intro-
duction of universal conscription – a democratic innova-
tion that France’s conservative opponents were loathe to
adopt. The continuous flow of replacements lowered the
risks of pitched battle. One reason these had been rare
among the professional armies of the Old Regime was that
replacing losses was so difficult. Napoleon’s battles also
counted for more than those of the past, because they were
conducted, at the tactical level, in ways designed to destroy
the adversary’s organizational cohesion, so that he could
not renew resistance later on. Eighteenth-century battles
were as violent as any in history, but they did not decide
the wars in which they occurred, because the armies of that
day were too brittle to risk the ruthless pursuit in which
Napoleon specialized. The great battles of the Seven
Years’ War (1756-63), for instance, all took place during
its first four years; whereas the war itself was finally
brought to an end by the mutual exhaustion of all con-
cerned. The war of which Austerlitz was a part, in contrast,
was over three weeks later, a tantalizing example of strate-
gic efficiency from which, it was hoped, much could be
learned.
Jomini attributed Napoleon’s success to his superior
grasp of a small number of timeless principles. In so doing,
he assimilated the Emperor’s unnerving career to a famil-
iar scientific structure. The prominence afforded to spatial
relationships by earlier writers was preserved, and ren-
dered more flexible and realistic by a new concentration on
the reciprocal interactions of opposing armies, rather than
on geographic objectives or terrain features. War was not
won by holding ground deemed important, Jomini de-
clared, but by beating the opponent in the field. Although
maneuver remained the key to victory, its goal was not to
substitute for fighting, but to bring it about. Jomini stressed
the inherent superiority of the offensive, and the impor-
tance of seizing the initiative and dominating the enemy;
likewise the need for deception and surprise, and for ener-
getically pursuing a beaten foe. Above all, he insisted that
the acme of strategic excellence lay in concentrating supe-
rior forces against what he called “the decisive point,” with
the goal of destroying the enemy army.
It is not always easy, given Jomini’s stress upon en-
ergetic and aggressive conduct, to recognize his work for
what it was: a conservative synthesis well-suited to the
needs of a post-Revolutionary international order that, far
from wishing to reanimate the ghost of Napoleon, longed
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to get the genie of war back into the bottle of professional
strategy. In practice, Jomini’s ideas made the conduct of
decisive military operations terribly difficult. His emphasis
on concentrated forces, methodical planning, and secure
communications, made the other things he admired – of-
fensive operations, cunning maneuver, vigorous pursuit –
almost impossible. He himself believed his ideas were best
suited to small, well-trained professional armies, of a kind
that the industrial revolution would soon make obsolete:
only mass armies could survive the storm of steel un-
leashed by modern weapons. This was a process whose
onset Jomini lived to see – he died in 1869, at the age of
90. Yet he remained insistent that the basic principles of
war exemplified by Napoleon, and codified by Jomini
himself, would survive all technological change – a point
of view that has been thoroughly vindicated by events. All
good armies today profess to base their doctrine and op-
erational methods upon “principles of war” recognizably
similar to those Jomini identified [See Appendix 1].
Jomini is the most influential strategic theorist of
modern times. This may seem surprising, given the even-
tual eclipse of his personal reputation by that of his great
contemporary, Clausewitz. Yet the practical impact of
Jomini’s ideas can hardly be overstated. He rescued the
scientific spirit of the Enlightenment from the mechanistic
rigidity that threatened to overwhelm it in the military
sphere. His insistence that warfare be based upon univer-
sally applicable, but also broadly adaptable, principles,
rather than upon a dogmatic system of approved practices,
was an intellectual advance of lasting importance. At the
same time, however, and no less consequentially, Jomini
detached Napoleon’s achievements from their revolution-
ary roots, and infused military theory with a political and
social naïveté from which it still struggles to free itself.
Jomini’s work purported to demonstrate that the essence of
military success lay in rational decision-making, designed
to bring opposing armies together in a sequence of violent
clashes whose political implications would be readily ap-
parent. It was a point of view understandably reassuring to
those called upon to fight, but one that would scarcely
come up to the realities of modern war.
Clausewitz and the Modernization of War
For Jomini the wars of Napoleon constituted a clari-
fying moment, when rules dimly grasped by the greatest
soldiers of earlier times were finally made plain to all. It
was a broadly persuasive vision. Some, however, saw dif-
ferently. One who did was Carl von Clausewitz. Clause-
witz was born in Prussia in 1780. He entered the army as
an officer cadet at the age of 12, on the eve of what would
prove to be a quarter-century of war against Revolutionary
France. Afterwards his career devolved into a series of
conventional peace-time assignments, including a long
stint as administrative head of the military academy in
Berlin, a post that required no teaching, but afforded ample
opportunity for study. He died of cholera in 1831, having
published virtually nothing. Among his literary remains
was the unfinished manuscript of On War, which was
published by Clausewitz’s widow the year after his death.
On War is widely regarded as a perplexing text. It
may be useful, by way of introducing some of Clause-
witz’s ideas, to consider why this is so. Part of the diffi-
culty lies in the fact that Clausewitz died before complet-
ing his work, so that it contains more incidental inconsis-
tencies and gaps than it might have. Part also lies in his
habit of never considering any action in isolation from the
reaction it inspires, a form of analysis that may appear to
introduce contradiction where a synthesis is intended. Still,
much of On War is presented in a perfectly straight-
forward way. If propositions like “every attack loses im-
petus as it proceeds,” or “war does not consist in a single
blow,” or “the only means in war is combat,” are judged
baffling, it cannot be because they are complicated in
themselves.
One source of complexity is Clausewitz’s determina-
tion to view concepts from every possible angle, and to
demonstrate their application by attaching them to meta-
phorical or historical referents that illustrate his meaning
without necessarily exhausting it. A good example is the
brilliant and oft-cited analysis at the end of the first chapter
of On War, in which Clausewitz compares war’s “domi-
nant tendencies” to “a remarkable Trinity, composed,” as
he says:
of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which
are to be regarded as a blind force of nature; of the
play of chance and probability within which the
creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of
subordination, as an instrument of policy, which
makes it subject to reason alone.
The first of these three aspects mainly con-
cerns the people; the second the commander and his
army; the third the government. The passions that
are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in
the people; the scope which the play of courage and
talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and
chance depends on the particular character of the
commander and the army; but the political aims are
the business of government alone.
These three tendencies are like three different
codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet
variable in their relationship to one another. A the-
ory that ignores any of one of them or seeks to fix
an arbitrary relationship between them would con-
flict with reality to such an extent that for this rea-
son alone it would be totally useless.
Our task therefore is to develop a theory that
maintains a balance between these three tendencies,
like an object suspended between three magnets.16
                                                 
16 Ibid., 89.
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Any number of readers have concluded from this fa-
mous passage that the “Trinity” to which Clausewitz refers
is comprised of the people, the army, and the government;
and, in addition, that all three must be committed to war,
lest the resulting imbalance lead to defeat. There is no
question that this reading is wrong. Clausewitz’s Trinity
consists of abstractions: violence, chance, and reason, all
themes that recur repeatedly throughout his work. His as-
sociation of these concepts with the people, the army, and
government, respectively (which, incidentally, does not
recur) may appear reasonable, and is certainly worth pon-
dering; yet it does not describe all the possibilities even in
Clausewitz’s day, much less throughout history. Clause-
witz’s own studies of Napoleon’s campaigns leave no
doubt that the “blind force of nature” propelling French
armies across Europe did not come from the French peo-
ple, but from Napoleon himself, in whom the functions of
“army” and “government” combined. Similarly, Clause-
witz’s assertion that all elements of the Trinity deserve
equal consideration is qualified at once by the observation
that, despite their logically co-equal status, no fixed rela-
tionship could be established among them; a warning that
might have made more of an impression if it had not been
followed by an elegant but misleading reference to theory
“balance[d]” among three magnets, again suggesting a
condition of equilibrium where none is required: it is, after
all, perfectly possible to suspend an object among magnets
of unequal strength.17
Despite its rhetorical difficulty, On War remains the
greatest work on its subject yet written. Its subject, how-
ever, is war, not strategy as such. For Clausewitz, the ex-
pansion of war during his lifetime represented a call, not to
perfect received ideas, but to reconsider first principles.
Although Clausewitz has much to say about how war
should be conducted, such matters are of secondary im-
portance, and are addressed by way of illustrating and
fleshing out more fundamental arguments. His governing
concerns are cognitive and phenomenological. On War
sets out to show what war is, what it does, and how it can
be known. It is not a book about how to fight. It is a book
about how to think about war.
Part of what sets Clausewitz’s work apart is its atti-
tude toward the past. As has been suggested, the rise of
natural science invigorated the study of human affairs, by
providing a new model of intellectual rigor and excellence.
It also helped dissolve the notion, prevalent throughout the
Middle Ages and into the Renaissance, that Western his-
tory was a story of decline from the achievements of
Greece and Rome. With the advent of the new science,
                                                 
17 Not all misreadings of this famous passage can be explained by
its rhetorical complexity. A recent and baffling example is Martin
Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York, 1991), in
which Clausewitz is presented as a proponent of “Trinitarian
war,” that is, “a war of state against state and army against army”
(49) from which the people are entirely excluded.
history became a tale of progress, in which each generation
profited from the experiences of those who had gone be-
fore. It was in these terms that Jomini thought about Na-
poleonic warfare: it was the culmination of a long process
of trial and error, of “lessons learned,” leading at last to a
break-through from which durable conclusions could be
drawn.
For Clausewitz, however, the fact of historical
change did not present a story of progress. It testified to
the instability of human affairs and the limitations of hu-
man knowledge. The past did not point toward the present,
but was simply itself, coherent in its own terms, but no
more. It was not possible, for instance, to declare Napo-
leon a better general than Frederick the Great, as Jomini
did, simply because Napoleon conquered more territory,
won more battles, commanded more powerful armies, and
so on. Such perceived superiority, in Clausewitz’s view,
was the product of social and political conditions that had
not existed in Frederick’s time, and would not last forever.
The future would render Napoleon’s methods as obsolete
as those of Frederick or, for that matter, Attila the Hun.
The goal of theory therefore could not be to define the
ideal form that war should take, so that soldiers could
strive to achieve it. The best that could be hoped for were
theoretical insights that could improve our understanding
of war as it really happened.
The question posed by history for theory was thus not
“Where does all this lead?” but rather “What factors gov-
ern war in all its forms?”. Most basic, and the starting
point of Clausewitz’s analysis, is violence: war is a violent
clash of wills, whose defining features arise from the mu-
tual antagonism of the opponents. If one holds this propo-
sition up against the historical record, however, as
Clausewitz did, a question arises. There is nothing in the
idea of violence itself that would limit its scope. Yet the
violence of war is obviously limited by any number of
practical difficulties – which Clausewitz characterized as
“friction” – and often also by the goals of the belligerents.
While all wars were a clash of wills, the issues at stake
might not always justify the maximum use of force. War, it
seemed, had a “dual nature”: most were fought for limited
purposes, and employed limited means. A few were fought
to overthrow the enemy completely, in which case vio-
lence might approach the highest level that friction would
allow. Either way, however, there was no doubt of war’s
subordinate status: it was “simply a continuation of politi-
cal intercourse, with the addition of other means.”18
                                                 
18 On War, 605. Clausewitz’s characterization of war as a politi-
cal instrument has often been misconstrued to mean that war is
brought about by politics, but that once it has begun its unique
requirements take precedence. This is not his meaning, as can be
seen if the cited passage is presented in its full context:
It is, of course, well known that the only source of war is
politics – the intercourse of governments and peoples; but
it is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse
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In appraising his own work, Clausewitz said that its
main value lay not in its conclusions, but in the way they
were arrived at. One distinctive feature of his method is a
pronounced realism, a refusal to make things simpler than
they are in order to get on with the task of reasoning about
them. This impulse is exemplified by the concept of “fric-
tion,” a metaphor from the world of engineering, by which
Clausewitz sought to grasp an aspect of war that was nor-
mally ignored: the tendency of things to go wrong, far
more disastrously than they do ordinarily.19 War, Clause-
witz observed, involved action in a resistant medium, like
walking underwater, an inconceivably difficult thing com-
pared to walking on land, if walking on land is all you
know. Even those who know what war is like, however,
might feel that the surest path to clarity requires that inci-
dental difficulties be ignored, in the same way that a sci-
entist seeking a consistent pattern or “signal” within a
mass of data is entitled, indeed required, to ignore the
“noise” that surrounds it. For Clausewitz, however, it was
unrealistic to adopt such an attitude toward war, in which
the effects of chance are so profound that they become the
signal, the central reality, and not an exogenous variable to
be discounted.
A similar approach underlies the related concept of
“genius,” the term Clausewitz used to describe the ele-
ments of character and intellect that make for success in
military commanders. “Genius” was friction’s theoretical
compliment, since it is the intelligence and willpower of
the commander that moves the machinery of war forward,
despite the friction that impedes it. Yet the sources of that
motive energy were mysterious, and could not be pre-
scribed systematically. For Clausewitz, “genius” did not
imply exceptional ability. On the contrary: even modest
success in an environment dominated by chance and dan-
ger cannot be achieved through the application of fixed
rules and procedures. Like many other writers on war,
Clausewitz sometimes compared war to art, another field
in which technical expertise is not sufficient to insure suc-
cess. The point, however, was not merely to affirm that
mental flexibility is a virtue in soldiers, but also, once
again, to insist on the subordination of theory to reality:
“what genius does,” Clausewitz wrote, “is the best rule,
                                                                                 
and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by
no law but its own.
We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a
continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of
other means. We deliberately use the phrase “with the
addition of other means” because we also want to make it
clear that war in itself does not suspend political inter-
course or change it into something entirely different. In
essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the
means it employs. The main lines along which military
events progress, and to which they are restricted, are po-
litical lines that continue throughout the war into the sub-
sequent peace.
19 See especially On War, 119-21.
and theory can do no better than show how and why this
should be the case.”20 As in art, true excellence in war
cannot be taught, only cultivated, and studied with as few
preconceptions as possible.
Clausewitz was intensely preoccupied with the psy-
chological dimensions of war, ranging from the communal
passions and political ambitions that animate military vio-
lence, to the fear and courage that accompany its use, to
the insights or mistakes that genius, or the lack of it, may
contribute to victory or defeat. This concern is well illus-
trated by another of his habitual metaphors, that of war as
a game. Analogies between war and games are almost al-
ways intended to capture war’s formal properties. The
greatest of all Western “war games” – chess – has pre-
cisely this character. When Clausewitz searched his mind
for a game that resembled war, however, he never thought
of chess, with its subtle positional strategies, but always of
gambling at cards, where the rules are simple, and the cal-
culation of risk is everything. If the first question of strat-
egy is “What is the war about?” the second, in a Clause-
witzian spirit, would have to be “How much do you want
to bet?” [See Appendix 2]
Clausewitz’s conviction that war was first and fore-
most a gamble defined his approach to strategy, in which
the inherent tension between the goals of policy and the
violence of its chosen instrument must somehow be recon-
ciled. The primacy of politics meant that there could never
be a purely military solution to any strategic problem.
Military objectives derived from political purposes, and
strategic plans should in turn be defined by, and propor-
tionate to, the objective. Yet it was also true that war’s
escalatory character could impress itself upon policy. Al-
though one side’s political goals might justify only a mod-
est military effort, the passions that violence inspired, as
each antagonist sought to outdo the other, would push
against such limits, raising the stakes as it did so. Such
complex interactions are always central to Clausewitz’s
thinking. Risk and reward, attack and defense, friction and
genius, reason and chance, strategy and politics – these and
other interdependent concepts weave their way throughout
his work, and provide its essential structure, like a few
bright threads in a heavily figured fabric. Each interacts
with, and is defined by, the other. None, Clausewitz would
have insisted, should ever be thought about alone.
If Jomini represents the apex of the classic tradition
of strategic theory, in which the deep, permanent structure
of military action takes center stage, Clausewitz is the
great modernist, for whom, as Marx said, “all that is solid
melts into air,” so that one is left to reason with what
Clausewitz called “variable quantities.”21 Among the gen-
                                                 
20 Ibid., 136; cf. the more extended discussion “On Military
Genius,” 100-12.
21 For Marx, see The Communist Manifesto, in Robert C. Tucker,
ed., The Marx-Engels Reader (2nd ed., New York, 1978), 475;
for Clausewitz, On War, 136.
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erations of soldiers that have followed him, the appeal of
his work has lain primarily in its emphasis upon psycho-
logical elements, and upon the preponderant role of un-
certainty and chance in war; though in neither case can one
speak with confidence about intellectual influence, still
less about clear and consistent understanding. The rapid
increase in firepower that followed the introduction of ri-
fled weapons in the 1840s meant that armies would grow
much larger, while adopting decentralized tactical methods
that put a premium upon initiative and spontaneous insight
at all levels of command. On the other hand, the simulta-
neous expansion of military planning, by which the im-
ponderables of the ever-expanding battlefield were sup-
posed to be tamed, re-introduced much of the intellectual
rigidity Clausewitz disdained; while the (for a time com-
monplace) proposition that superior morale and sacrificial
courage were an antidote to the lethality of modern weap-
ons would have struck him as the last word in absurdity.
The mechanization of war also strengthened the tech-
nocratic and managerial ethos of military officers, and with
it their natural resistance to Clausewitz’s most essential
proposition: that war is permeated by politics not just in its
origins and outcome, but at every level of its conduct. Al-
though soldiers in democratic countries have come to ac-
cept their subordination to civilian authority as a constitu-
tional principle, the actual introduction of political consid-
erations into the planning and execution of military opera-
tions is still invariably regarded as interference in an activ-
ity best left to professional experts.
Beyond the Battlefield: Sea Power
In the second half of the nineteenth century serious
thinking about land warfare was dominated by problems
posed by new technologies – rifled weapons, railroads,
telegraphic communications, etc. – that dramatically in-
creased the ability of armies to inflict casualties on each
other. The small, well-trained forces that prevailed in the
immediate post-Napoleonic period were replaced by mass
armies of conscripts, whose rapid initial mobilization was
judged strategically decisive. Once vast numbers of indif-
ferently-trained citizens-in-arms were in the field grap-
pling with each other, the chances of reaching a politically
useful result were regarded as slim. On the other hand, if a
fully-mobilized army equipped with modern weapons
could fall upon an unready opponent, swift victory seemed
assured. Speed was of the essence, because of the risk of
stalemate once defensive lines stabilized, and because the
social costs of war were thought to have increased. The
same technology-driven processes that made warfare more
deadly had (to all appearances) made advanced societies
more fragile, because of their dependence upon interna-
tional markets and suppliers, and because of the rising im-
portance of industrial workers, who might seize upon pro-
tracted war as an opportunity to force revolutionary
change.
The burden of strategic theory on the eve of the First
World War was thus to preserve war’s usefulness as an
instrument of policy in the face of rising pressure from two
sources: industrial technology, and capitalism. As applied
to land warfare, the effect was to concentrate attention on
tactical and organizational issues. Strategy remained a
matter of relational maneuver by regular forces in space
and time, in which the key problem was what to do as the
space grew larger, the forces more deadly, and the time
shorter. Strategic success became identified with tactical
success, above all with prevailing in the first great clash of
arms at the outset of a war, from which all subsequent re-
sults would follow.
These same technical and economic forces also im-
pressed themselves upon navies, whose activities had pre-
viously been of no great interest to military theorists. In the
Age of Sail, naval warfare was a more technically de-
manding problem than war on land: building, maintaining,
and fighting sailing warships required all kinds of special-
ized knowledge, plus a capital-intensive infrastructure far
more elaborate than that required to field a good army. Yet
naval war had never been subjected to comprehensive
analysis, since its strategic effects were thought to be rea-
sonably well accounted for by another emerging field of
social theory: economics.
Sailing navies were the instruments by which Euro-
pean empires were created. Water was also the only ave-
nue over which large quantities of goods could be moved
economically. These facts defined the basic role of navies
in war, which was to disrupt the sea-borne commerce of
the other side while protecting that of their own. The re-
sulting deprivation, accumulating over years, might con-
tribute to an adversary’s decision to sue for peace, and was
worthwhile anyway to the extent that resources and mar-
kets that had once been his would now become yours. But
even granting all that, the means by which such slowly
mounting pressure was applied seemed to be of limited
importance.
War at sea was a natural strategic expression of the
economic competition between states: the pursuit of com-
merce by other means. This conformed to the dominant
economic outlook of pre-industrial Europe, known as
“mercantilism,” which defined economic success in terms
of the accumulation of assets under a state's control. Ab-
sent self-sustaining economic growth, material life was
regarded as a zero-sum game, in which the interests of all
states conflicted. To mercantile theorists like Louis XIV's
great minister of finance, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-83),
the founder of the modern French navy, trade, piracy, and
war all ran together along a single continuum of rivalry
and conflict.
One of the achievements of early capitalist econom-
ics was to have challenged these conceptions, and in so
doing to have ushered in a new, if strategically problem-
atic, understanding of the relationship between war and a
state’s economic interests. Market theorists like Adam
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Smith (1723-90) and David Ricardo (1772-1823) identi-
fied a society's economic success not with the hoarding up
of wealth, but with mutually beneficial exchange and the
circulation of money, two processes that operated most
efficiently when least disrupted by government action.
It soon became apparent that these new ideas might
force a revision of strategic thinking. Capitalists calculated
the cost of war on less favorable terms than their mercan-
tilist predecessors. In addition to the direct expense of
maintaining navies and armies, and of suffering destruc-
tion and death, they added large intangible expenses,
caused by the disruption of commerce, foregone invest-
ment, and the tendency of war to go hand in hand with
protectionist trade practices. These were, in aggregate, an
immense tax upon organized violence – more economi-
cally significant, it was argued, than the immediate suf-
fering war caused. From the point of view of free-market
economics, war was no different than other misguided
practices, like excise taxes or the licensing of monopolies,
in which governments engaged only because they were
ignorant of the true costs.
It goes without saying that those professionally con-
cerned with the conduct of war were not prepared to con-
cede that the “final argument” of international relations
had somehow relocated from the battlefield to the market-
place. Yet strategy could not but take account of new ma-
terial conditions, of which the new economics was merely
a theoretical expression. On land, as has been said, the
response was to focus attention on the swift destruction of
the organized forces of the enemy, and to underline the
efficiency of new technology, whose increased lethality
was purported to make war less destructive by making it
shorter. On the high seas, however, a more searching ap-
praisal was called for. It was not possible to disentangle
maritime war completely from the civil commerce that
surrounded it. It was, however, possible to provide it, for
the first time, with an explicit theoretical foundation, upon
which new claims for naval warfare’s decisiveness and
economic rationality might be based.
These were the accomplishments of an American na-
val officer, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who sought to do for
naval war what Jomini had done for war on land: define its
basic principles, from which operational methods could be
derived. 22  Mahan proposed that what he called “sea
power” was the key to world history, and the central reality
of modern war. No nation cut off from its normal overseas
suppliers and markets could wage industrialized war for
long. Conversely, a belligerent that “commanded” the sea
could do what it wished militarily, while continuing to
afford its people the material goods to which they were
accustomed. To command the sea meant to drive the en-
emy from it, a task that could only be accomplished by a
battle fleet comprised of the most powerful ships available.
                                                 
22 The most famous of Mahan’s many works is The Influence of
Seapower upon History, 1660-1783 (New York, 1890).
No lesser naval force could stay in the same water with
such a fleet, and its ability to go anywhere meant that, once
its supremacy was secure, its influence would become
general. The crucial step in securing command of the sea
was thus to defeat the enemy fleet, which should be
crushed in battle (or bottled up in its harbors) at the earliest
possible moment [See Appendix 3].
Mahan’s conclusions were based on historical study,
chiefly of the great contest for global supremacy fought
out between France and Great Britain between the acces-
sion of Louis XIV and the downfall of Napoleon. Mahan
attributed Britain’s eventual triumph to its consistent abil-
ity to defeat the French fleet in battle. Without such victo-
ries, Mahan believed, it would have been impossible for
the British to blockade the French coast, harass its trade,
and so on. This was, to say the least, a selective reading of
a complex period, a point made with great force by the
British writer Julian Corbett.23
Corbett, like Mahan, affirmed the strategic impor-
tance of navies, while following Clausewitz in insisting
that the actual exercise of sea power was a more diversi-
fied business than Mahan claimed. At no time during the
period Mahan had studied, for instance, had the French
navy ceased to operate, while most naval actions had been
fought by single ships and small squadrons, rather than by
great, concentrated fleets. Nor were great battles demon-
strably decisive at the strategic level. The last “fleet ac-
tion” of the Napoleonic Wars – Trafalgar – occurred ten
years before Waterloo, and involved only a small fraction
of the ships available to both sides. For most of that subse-
quent decade France and its allies still had more warships
than Great Britain did. It was only continuous pressure by
dispersed British squadrons that had prevented those re-
sources from coalescing into a force capable of threatening
Britain itself. In the end, Corbett proposed, it was on the
battlefield that British sea power had made its greatest
contribution – by cutting off Napoleon’s army in Egypt,
while sustaining that of Wellington in Iberia, and above all
by protecting the trade and colonial possessions that pro-
vided the money with which Britain paid the expenses of
the continental armies that finally brought Napoleon down.
Navies, Corbett concluded, might weigh heavily in war;
but their strategic effects were inherently indirect, attri-
tional, and time-consuming.
Corbett was, beyond argument, the superior historian
and, one may feel, the better prophet. Yet Mahan’s outlook
proved more persuasive, in part because it glossed over
some of the practical limitations of steam-and-steel war-
ships. Such vessels possessed irresistible tactical advan-
tages over their wooden-hulled predecessors, but lacked
the range and staying power of ships that required no fuel.
Close blockade, long the classic expedient of strong na-
vies, was ruled out by the deep drafts and short loiter times
                                                 
23 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (New
York, 1911).
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of the new warships, and by new weapons – long-range
coastal guns, underwater mines, and torpedoes – that made
it exceedingly dangerous to bring modern ships close to a
hostile shore. On the other hand, the classic expedient of
weak navies – commerce raiding – was despised by the
increasingly influential commercial interests of all nations,
and was deemed a waste of resources in any case, since the
small, fast ships required to perform that mission were of
no use in an encounter between battle fleets. In truth, the
industrialization of navies had transformed them into great,
powerful beasts with short legs and poor eye-sight, best
suited to fight each other. Mahan’s conception of sea
power, however unsatisfactory as a comprehensive histori-
cal analysis, provided a compelling explanation why that
was precisely what they should do, while leaving the
world’s commerce in peace.
Mahan’s work, far more than that of any earlier
writer on strategy, attracted a wide readership among ci-
vilians fascinated by a vision of global politics that only
navies could create, based upon a high-tech infrastructure
of canals, coaling stations, dockyards, steel mills, and so
on. Later on his reputation would decline, because the fu-
ture failed to live up to the expectations his books inspired.
The battle fleets of the Great Powers did not determine the
outcome of the First World War, while the advent of sea-
going submarines rescued commerce-raiding from the
dustbin of history, and turned it into what appeared for a
while to be a war-winning strategy. A similarly discon-
certing pattern followed in World War II, in which naval
warfare by the winning side was dominated by commerce
protection and amphibious operations – two missions that
Mahan had deemed strategically obsolete.
The industrial revolution proved to be less favorable
to the interests of navies than Mahan imagined. Although
the progressive globalization of the world economy in-
creased the value of the goods that moved across the
oceans, and so the value of “commanding” those oceans in
war, it also introduced new modes of transportation – rail-
roads, paved highways, eventually airplanes – that reduced
the relative advantages of movement over water, and con-
tributed to the growth of integrated continental economies
highly resistant to the effects of prolonged deprivation.24
But even so, navies had less reason to be disappointed
about the future than armies did. Neither of the world wars
was settled by a great initial clash of arms, and in the end
victory in both (and in the Cold War that followed) went to
alliances that included the great maritime democracies,
which held on long enough to mobilize a crushing material
superiority. Sea power thus remains an important theoreti-
                                                 
24 The crucial figure in the development of this line of reasoning
was the British geographer Halford Mackinder, whose ideas were
first formulated in a seminal article entitled “The Geographic
Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal 23/4 (1904). Cf. Paul
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London,
1976), 177-202.
cal conception, less because its possession ensures victory
than because its absence has proved to be disproportion-
ately associated with defeat.
Imagining Armageddon: Air Power
The investigation of sea power as a subject of strate-
gic analysis was the most important theoretical achieve-
ment of the decades preceding the First World War. Af-
terwards, interest shifted to war in the air, the most striking
military innovation of the early twentieth century, and one
whose theoretical implications have proven exceptionally
challenging. Here one encounters a unique intellectual
pattern, in which theory, rather than scouring the historical
record for useful precedents (of which there are, of course,
none) has often boldly anticipated practice.
From the moment hot-air balloons were invented in
the 1780s, observers had no difficulty devising military
uses for them, ranging from the sudden descent of airborne
troops to great contests between what Tennyson called
“airy navies, grappling in the central blue” (“Locksley
Hall,” 1842). Except for a few experiments with observa-
tion balloons, however, military applications remained
fanciful for over a century, until machinery was developed
to steer “air ships” independently of the wind. In 1908 the
English novelist H. G. Wells could imagine an armada of
German dirigibles crossing the Atlantic to devastate New
York City (War in the Air, 1908). By then the real em-
bodiment of air power – the airplane – was not quite five
years old. Yet all of its military uses, from scouting to
strategic bombing, had already been foreseen by an eager,
if overly sanguine, public.25
The First World War provided practical experience
against which expectations could be tested. Tens of thou-
sands of military aircraft were produced between 1914 and
1918. Most were employed in reconnaissance, or in the
related task of shooting down enemy planes. Larger air-
craft were also built, however, and by the end of the war
all major belligerents (except the United States) had suf-
fered civilian casualties from aerial bombing. Ground at-
tack aircraft featured prominently in the last German of-
fensive of 1918, as they would have in future allied opera-
tions, had the war gone on longer. Airplanes also played
their part at sea, delivering mines and torpedoes, scouting
for surface fleets, and hunting submarines. Although air-
planes were nowhere decisive, their ubiquity and versatil-
ity were impressive.
Air power theory arose from trying to draw the les-
sons from these evocative experiences. The most important
early commentator was an Italian artillery officer, Guilio
Douhet, whose Command of the Air (1921) established a
                                                 
25 On the cultural antecedents of air power theory, see Michael
Paris, Winged Warfare: The Literature and Theory of Aerial
Warfare in Britain, 1859-1917 (Manchester, 1992), esp. 15-65;
and Beril Becker, Dreams and Realities of the Conquest of the
Skies (New York, 1967).
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number of propositions that have proven central to all sub-
sequent discussions of its subject. Douhet believed the
Great War demonstrated the futility of offensive ground
operations, the only form of military action that had ever
promised a decisive strategic result. In the air, however,
everything favored the attacker, a conclusion justified less
by the still-modest striking power of airplanes than by the
apparent difficulty of shooting them down. Wars in the
future would therefore begin with all-out air offensives
against the enemy’s cities, with the goal of delivering a
psychological shock so profound that the government
would have no choice but to surrender [See Appendix 4].
Although some might cavil about the inhumanity of such
action – deliberate attacks on civilians were (and are) a
war crime – Douhet was sure that no belligerent would
forego the advantages of a preemptive blow, if only be-
cause the only way to avoid being on the receiving end
was to beat the enemy to the punch. The result, in any
case, could scarcely be more barbaric than the slaughter-
house of the Western Front.
Douhet’s analysis begged a number of important
questions. It was not obvious, for instance, exactly how the
psychological effects he imagined, should they occur,
would make themselves felt on a government, particularly
one not dependent upon democratic public opinion; nor
whether a regime thus delegitimized would still be able to
come to terms. The result of Wells’ imaginary attack on
New York had not been peace, after all, but civil anarchy
and guerilla war. Airpower advocates in maritime coun-
tries – Hugh Trenchard in Britain, for instance, and Billy
Mitchell in the United States – were inclined to conceive
of strategic bombing less apocalyptically, as a means to
wear away the enemy’s material resources.26 In this view,
air strategy should focus on the destruction of war indus-
tries and civil infrastructure over an extended period. Such
a methodical approach rejected Douhet’s speculative social
psychology in favor of ordinary strategic rationality: the
losing side would be the one that first decided that suffer-
ing further bombardment was too high a price to pay for
whatever interests it had at stake.
In continental countries with strong traditions of land
warfare, on the other hand, air power was seen less as an
alternative to tactical stalemate than as a solution to it.
Although no one was prepared to dismiss strategic bomb-
ing out of hand, strategists in Germany and the Soviet
Union were more inclined to view airplanes as something
like flying artillery.27 Aircraft in this role might bring
                                                 
26 For theoretical developments in Britain, see Neville Jones, The
Origins of Strategic Bombing (London, 1973); for the United
States, Michael Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power (New
Haven, 1987). There is an excellent, critical summary in Wil-
liamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1983), 321-39.
27 On the role of airplanes in reviving hopes for combined arms
ground operations between the wars, see Shimon Naveh,. In Pur-
about a decisive engagement on the ground before the ef-
fects of strategic bombing, however conceived, could be-
gin to take hold. In these terms, air power did not make
land warfare irrelevant. It simply provided the lubricant for
a revival of offensive ground operations.
All these promises seemed to be equally well re-
deemed by the experience of the Second World War,
which began with German forces sweeping across Europe,
supported by large wings of ground-attack aircraft. Yet the
war did not end, and as it dragged on strategic bombing
came to seem less an antidote to attrition than one of its
instruments. The climactic annihilation of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki incorporated just the kind of moral shock Douhet
had foreseen. Yet the fact that these blows had come at the
end of years of grinding struggle, against an adversary
with no means to respond, made their significance difficult
to fathom amidst the general rubble.
Similar ambiguities confronted sailors, who, like
their counterparts on land, recognized that aircraft might
be used to solve traditional problems – reconnaissance and
commerce protection especially. More broadly, however,
“sea power” and “air power” were viewed as rival concep-
tions, contending for the honor of having displaced land
armies from the center of strategic calculation. Their con-
vergence in the form of the modern aircraft carrier would
transform naval tactics, but not naval strategy. In the Sec-
ond World War carriers replaced battleships as the capital
ships of modern navies because airplanes could perform
the functions of naval guns more effectively. Yet the very
survival of the idea of the “capital ship,” itself an importa-
tion from the Age of Sail, suggests strong continuity with
the past. Warships now fought each other at vastly greater
ranges, but for a familiar purpose: to command the sea.
Total War, People’s War, and the Crisis of Theory
It is a nice question whether the atomic bombs
dropped on Japan in August, 1945 were an expression of
air power, sea power, or the continued vitality of combined
arms land warfare. All three were certainly needed to get
the bombs to their targets. Afterward, however, doubts
would accrue as to whether any of them would ever work
properly again. The power of nuclear weapons, it was
quickly suspected, might make all other forms of warfare
irrelevant; though in truth, their status as the embodiments
of modern strategic disillusionment was only symbolic.
Upwards of fifty million people died in the Second World
War, of whom only a tiny fraction were killed by atomic
bombs. Even had the latter never existed, sane observers
would have had cause to wonder whether “organized vio-
lence” had become such a hopeless oxymoron as to render
the pretensions of strategy vain.
                                                                                 
suit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory
(London, 1998); on German air doctrine particularly, see also
Murray, Strategy for Defeat, esp. 1-27.
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From Montecuccoli to Douhet, the central promise of
strategic theory had been to preserve war’s political utility
by limiting its social costs, and subordinating its violent
character to rational control. Every intervening expansion
in the speed, range, and lethality of weapons had been in-
terpreted as an improvement in military efficiency,
whereby war could do its work, decide the “final argu-
ment,” more effectively. The mass armies that were re-
quired to absorb the impact of the new weapons were seen
in much the same light. They insured modern wars would
be short and sharp by introducing a self-limiting social
dynamic: industrial economies could not stand the strain of
protracted conflict, but would quickly cease to produce the
military wherewithal necessary for the war to continue –
undoubtedly the most calamitous strategic miscalculation
of modern times, and one based entirely upon prejudice
and presumption, masquerading as military expertise.
In the aftermath of the world wars it had become rea-
sonable to wonder whether all the mental energy expended
on the conduct of war could do any more than alter its sur-
face features. As drawn on a map, the Second World War
had looked quite different from the First: no trenches to
memorialize futility this time, but a war of fire and move-
ment, with fleets of airplanes blackening the sky, and great
ships plying the waters of the world. Yet the result had
been the same: superior economic resources and social
resiliency had proven more important than any stratagem
the armed forces of the belligerents could dream up. The
final blow had been delivered by a weapon whose power
obviously exceeded the requirements of any rational pol-
icy. Afterward, the world found itself beset by waves of
vernacular and revolutionary violence whose methods bore
little resemblance to those endorsed by military profes-
sionals, and against which even the atomic bomb offered
no remedy. No matter how you looked at it, strategic the-
ory as traditionally understood had ceased to add up.
In some respects, the problem resembles one that
arose, at about the same time, for Newtonian physics, from
which early-modern social theory drew inspiration. New-
ton and his colleagues believed the laws of nature as they
understood them were valid everywhere: universality was
for them implicit in the very ideas of “theory” and “law.”
Later, potentially disconcerting discoveries – for instance,
that most of the universe consisted of empty space – were
accommodated through a process of theoretical inflation,
by which new observations, made possible by a combina-
tion of better technology and human ingenuity, were as-
similated as marginal or exceptional cases within an estab-
lished paradigm.
As a consequence, physics at the end of the nine-
teenth century had come to resemble a gimcrack system of
empirical expedients, rather than a robust intellectual
structure. Over the next few decades, however, the root of
the problem was finally exposed: the physics of interstellar
space on the one hand, and of sub-atomic particles on the
other, turn out to be unlike what Newton had supposed,
and also unlike each other. Afterwards, physics would re-
main a coherent field of inquiry. Yet it presently contains
no body of theory that works equally well for all three
realms: the very large, the very small, and the middle-sized
world of ordinary experience in between.
For strategists, the realm of the very large is often de-
scribed as “total war,” a phrase that covers at least two
general possibilities: war with nuclear weapons or by other
exceptionally destructive methods; but also war in which
the broadest possible range of social energy and resources
are harnessed to military effort. Both share the quality that
the means of fighting threaten to overwhelm the ends for
which they are applied. Clausewitz, for whom the interac-
tion of ends and means was always central, was among the
first to recognize that such wars might be the wave of the
future. In his own time, he believed,
war, untrammeled by any conventional restraints,
had broken loose in all its elemental fury. This was
due to the people’s share in the great affairs of
state. Will this always be the case in the future? …
Such questions are difficult to answer, and we are
the last to dare to say so. But the reader will agree
with us when we say that once barriers – which in a
sense consist only in man’s ignorance of what is
possible – are torn down, they are not so easily set
up again.28
Clausewitz said that his discussion of what he called
“people’s war,” which is unique in the literature on war up
to then, was “less an objective analysis than a groping for
the truth,” because such wars were not yet common. As to
what that truth might finally hold, however, we may con-
template Clausewitz’s description of the choices facing a
society left naked to its enemies because its armies have
been defeated:
There will always be time enough to die; like a
drowning man who will clutch instinctively at a
straw, it is the natural law of the moral world that a
nation that finds itself on the brink of an abyss will
try to save itself by any means.
No matter how small and weak a state may be
in comparison with its enemy, it must not forego
these last efforts, or one would conclude that its
soul is dead.… A government that, after having lost
a major battle, is only interested in letting its people
go back to sleep in peace as soon as possible and,
overwhelmed by feelings of failure and disap-
pointment, lacks the courage and desire to put forth
a final effort … shows that it did not deserve to
win, and, possibly for that very reason, was unable
to.29
                                                 
28 On War, 593.
29 Ibid., 483.
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Clausewitz did not envision nuclear war. Yet, as can
be seen here, he could envision conditions under which the
pursuit of politics gives way to something approaching
existential violence, war not to advance or defend commu-
nity interests, but to affirm or create communal identity. In
1812, when Prussia had to decide between an alliance with
France or resistance against crushing odds, Clausewitz
proposed that even total destruction would be better than
capitulation, since courageous self-annihilation would sow
the seeds for national rebirth later on.30 At such moments,
when the answer to the question “How much do you want
to bet?” becomes “Everything,” the normal categories of
strategic and political analysis collapse. Ends and means
cease to interact, but converge to a single point. Strategic
plan, military “decision,” and political consequence all
become one.
Whether the same is true in the realm of the very
small – the warfare of guerillas, partisans, terrorists, and so
on – is more difficult to say. These too are forms of “peo-
ple’s war,” in which traditional military methods appear to
be turned on their head, and the instruments of military
violence slip the leash of professional control. And here
indeed one must be careful, for our whimsical association
of such conflicts with the realm of the very small in phys-
ics is not intended to revive the nineteenth-century conceit
about “small wars,” as colonial conflicts of that era were
often called. Such wars are in fact simply the wars of the
weak, small in the scale of violence they employ, but not
in the interests that may be at stake, nor in the passions
they arouse.
The collapse of Europe’s global hegemony between
1914 and 1945 created conditions in which revolutionary
and irregular warfare gained new significance, and in-
spired an understandable pessimism among the practitio-
ners of “Newtonian” strategies based upon massive fire-
power, logistical abundance, spatial maneuver, and deci-
sive engagement, who now found themselves on the losing
end of conflicts in which they seemed, at first glance, to
enjoy every advantage. Yet it is not at all obvious that the
underlying logic of ends and means, action and decision,
cohesion and disruption, strategy and politics, is over-
turned by the choice of unconventional military methods.
There is, in any case, no reason whatever to believe that
the new prominence of the revolutionary guerilla and ter-
rorist will render organized armed forces as traditionally
understood irrelevant. On the contrary: any political com-
munity capable of fielding such forces – including those
established by revolutionary means – always does so. The
social costs of “people’s war” are indeed almost unbeara-
bly high, and as we have seen, it is the perennial goal of
strategy to keep those costs under control.
                                                 
30 “Political Declaration,” in Peter Paret and Daniel Moran, ed.
and trans., Carl von Clausewitz: Historical and Political Writings
(Princeton, 1992), 290.
That the task remains difficult does not mean the ef-
fort is not worthwhile. In the first half-century of the nu-
clear era, the only form of warfare that has been ruled out
is nuclear war itself – a surprise, but hardly unprecedented
in that respect. Theory is always condemned to be sur-
prised by real events that have failed to conform to its ex-
pectations, or, indeed, to its forebodings. This is as it must
be. If the results in war are never final, as Clausewitz said,
the same must be true for those who seek intellectual
mastery over it.
Appendix 1
Jomini: Principles of War
The fundamental principle upon which every military
combination rests, is to operate with the greatest mass of
forces, a combined effort, upon a decisive point. The
methods of applying this maxim are not numerous; let us
endeavor to point them out.
The first measure is to take the initiative… . The gen-
eral who takes the initiative knows what he is to do. He
conceals his march, surprises and overwhelms one ex-
tremity or a feeble part of his adversary’s lines. He who
awaits the attack is beaten upon one of his points even
before he may be informed of the attack.
The second measure is to direct our movement
against the most advantageous feeble part. The choice of
that feeble part depends upon the position of the enemy.
The most important point will always be the one whose
occupation will ensure us the most favorable opportunities
and results; for example, positions that tend to give us
control of the enemy’s communications with his base of
operations, or to throw him back upon an insurmountable
obstacle, such as a sea, a great river without a bridge, or
the territory of a strong neutral power.
In order to operate a combined effort with a strong
mass upon a single point, it is important, in conducting the
strategic movement, to hold our forces concentrated upon a
space nearly square, that they may be more disposable… .
It is most important, when we take the initiative of a
decisive movement, that we should be careful to perfectly
inform ourselves of the positions of the enemy and of the
movements he can make….
It is of the greatest importance that the combined at-
tack of all our forces be simultaneous. It is not the masses
present that decide a battle, but those which are brought
into action….
If the art of war consists in concentrating a superior
effort, with a mass against weak portions, it is most indis-
pensably necessary to follow up closely a beaten enemy.
The strength of an army consists in its organization, in the
unity resulting from the connection of all the several parts
with the head or the central power. After a defeat this unity
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or oneness no longer exists…. The entire army becomes
weak, and [a subsequent] attack upon it is almost certain
triumph.
To render the superior shock of a mass decisive, it is
equally necessary for a general to bestow the same care
upon the morale of his army. Of what use is it to bring into
action fifty thousand men against twenty thousand, if they
lack the impulsion necessary to rush upon and overthrow
the enemy?… All troops are brave when their leader sets
the example [of] true, heroic devotion. It is not well that a
soldier should remain under fire from fear of discipline
alone, but from pride and self-esteem, not yielding to being
outdone by his officers in honor and bravery.
Adapted from Antoine-Henri Jomini, Treatise on Grand Military
Operations [1816], translated by S. B. Holabird (New York,
1865), 2: 448-59, in John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The
History of the Principles of War (Westport, Conn., 1982), 204-8.
Appendix 2
Clausewitz: Friction, Chance, and Genius
Clausewitz’s strategic assessments often differed from the con-
ventional wisdom of his day (and ours), in part because of the
unusual weight he accorded to psychological and political factors
in war. This is illustrated in the conclusion to his History of the
Campaign of 1812 in Russia (1814-23). Most observers believed
that Napoleon’s famous defeat was a foreseeable result brought
about by objective conditions – the vastness of Russia, the cold-
ness of winter, and so on. For Clausewitz, Napoleon’s failure
demonstrated the complex interaction between military genius
and the uncertainties of war.
Finally, the author would like to offer his opinion on
Bonaparte’s plan of operation in this much-discussed cam-
paign.
Bonaparte wanted to conduct and conclude the war in
Russia as he had conducted and concluded all his cam-
paigns. To begin with decisive blows and to employ the
advantages he gained from them to achieve further deci-
sive battles, always placing his winnings on the next card
until the bank was broken – that was his way, and it must
be said that he owed the tremendous success that he had
had achieved only to this way; his degree of success was
scarcely conceivable by any other means….
To defeat the enemy’s army, to destroy it, to occupy
his capital, to drive the government to the farthest corner
of the country, and then in the chaos that followed to win
the peace – that until now had been the operational plan of
all his wars. In Russia he had the vastness of the country
against him and the disadvantage of two widely separated
capitals [Moscow and St. Petersburg]. These circum-
stances would diminish the psychological effects of his
victories, a loss that he probably hoped would be made up
by two other factors: one was the weakness of the Russian
government, its lack of energy and ability; the other, the
dissension that he might be able to sow between the nobil-
ity and the crown. This is why he was so disturbed when
he found Moscow abandoned and destroyed. From Mos-
cow he had hoped to influence opinion in St. Petersburg
and the rest of Russia.
That under these circumstances Bonaparte should
have attempted to reach Moscow in one thrust was only
logical.
The effects of Russia’s vast territory and of a possible
popular war – in short, the weight of a great state with all
its powers – could only make themselves felt gradually and
might prove overwhelming if he did not master them at the
first attempt.
[Even] if Bonaparte … had to count on two cam-
paigns to win the war, it still made a great difference
whether or not he reached Moscow in the first. Having
occupied the capital, he might hope to undermine prepara-
tions for further resistance by employing the power that
remained to him, the power to impress, to lead public
opinion astray, to turn people’s feelings against their duty.
…
These seem to us the natural conceptions of a man
like Bonaparte. It is simply a question of whether one can
say such a plan would not work in Russia, and whether
another might have been better.
We do not believe so. To defeat the Russian army,
disperse it, and occupy Moscow was a goal that could cer-
tainly be achieved in one campaign; but we believe that
this goal omits one further, essential condition: to remain
strong even in Moscow.
We believe that Bonaparte neglected this last consid-
eration solely out of the arrogant recklessness that was
characteristic of him. He reached Moscow with 90,000
men – and should have reached it with 200,000….
What of the other plan, which after the event some
critics held to be more reasonable or, as they prefer to
characterize it, more methodical?
Bonaparte should have halted his advance at the
Dnieper and Duna [Rivers], or at least concluded the cam-
paign with the occupation of Smolensk; then establish
himself in the occupied territory and secure his flanks to
achieve a better base of operations; arm the Poles, to in-
crease his striking power; and march on Moscow in the
following campaign, with a better start and more staying
power….
That would have meant ending the [first] campaign
without having defeated the Russian army, which would
have remained more or less intact, with Moscow not even
threatened. The Russian forces, which were still weak at
the start of the campaign, and which would nearly double
during its course, would thus have had time to prepare and
during the winter begin an offensive against the vastly
extended French defenses. …
Setting all this aside, however, we will concede the
possibility that such a campaign might have achieved its
goal and prepared the ground for further gains in the fol-
lowing campaign. But we must also consider matters as
they appeared from Bonaparte’s perspective: that he found
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the Russians only half prepared; that he brought a huge
preponderance of force against them; that he might gain a
victory that would give his whole enterprise that cataclys-
mic rapidity so essential to paralyzing the enemy; that he
could be fairly certain of reaching Moscow in one stride,
with the possibility of having peace in his pocket in three
months. If we consider all this, and compare these possi-
bilities with the results of a so-called methodical cam-
paign, it seems very likely that Bonaparte’s plan held a
greater probability of ultimate success than the other, and
that his was the correct way – not the more daring, but in
fact the more cautious of the two….
The dangers of the moment always exert the most
powerful influence on men, and therefore it often happens
that an action seems audacious which in the end proves to
be the only road to safety, and which is therefore the most
prudent course. Mere intelligence is rarely sufficient to
allow men to rise to this level of insight; it is for the most
part a natural boldness of character that equips an individ-
ual to discern such prudent paths. This boldness was so
much a part of the great conqueror that he would have cho-
sen the most audacious course from pure inclination, even
if his genius had not also shown it to be the wisest.
We repeat, everything that he was he owed to his
daring and resolute character; and his most triumphant
campaigns would have suffered the same censure as this
one, had they not succeeded.”
From Peter Paret and Daniel Moran, ed. and trans., Carl von
Clausewitz: Historical and Political Writings (Princeton, 1992),
201-4, emphasis in the original.
Appendix 3
Mahan: Sea Power
Alfred Thayer Mahan coined the term “sea power,” and identified
its central expression as the massed battle fleet. This basic idea is
set forth concisely in the following passage, from a work written
at the height of the naval rivalry between Germany and Great
Britain, which preceded the outbreak of the First World War.
Mahan’s view of the strategic issues were shared by both the
British and German admiralties at the time.
In naval operations [decisive] successes are wrought less
by the tenure of a [geographic] position than by the defeat
of the enemy’s organized force – his battle fleet. The same
result will follow, though less conclusive and less perma-
nent, if the fleet is reduced to inactivity by the immediate
presence of a superior force; but decisive defeat suitably
followed up, alone assures a situation. As has been re-
marked before, the value of any position, sea or land,
though very real, depends upon the use made of it; that is,
upon the armed forces which hold it, for defense or of-
fense. The sea is not without positions advantageous to
hold; but peculiarly to it, above the land, is applicable the
assertion that the organized force is the determining fea-
ture. The fleet, it may be said, is itself the position. A
crushing defeat of the fleet, or its decisive inferiority when
the enemy appears, means a dislocation at once of the
whole system of colonial or other dependencies, quite irre-
spective of the position where the defeat occurs. Such a
defeat of the British navy by the German in the North Sea
would lay open all English colonies to attack, and render
both them and the mother country unable to combine effort
in mutual support. The fall of any coast position in the
[British] Empire would then become a question only of
time and of the enemy’s exertions, unless the British navy
should be restored. Until then, there is no relieving force,
no army in the field. Each separate position is left to its
own resources, and when they are exhausted must suc-
cumb… . On the other hand, so long as the British fleet
can maintain and assert superiority in the North Sea and
around the British Islands, the entire Imperial system
stands secure. The key of the whole is held [by], is within,
the hulls of the ships.
From Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy Compared and
Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Opera-
tions on Land (Boston, 1911), 175-8.
Appendix 4
Douhet: Command of the Air
To have command of the air means to be in a position
to prevent the enemy from flying while retaining the abil-
ity to fly oneself. … An aerial fleet capable of dumping
hundreds of tons of bombs can easily be organized; there-
fore, the striking force and magnitude of aerial offensives,
considered from the standpoint of either material or moral
significance, is far more effective than those of any other
offensive yet known. A nation which had command of the
air is in a position to protect its own territory from enemy
aerial attack and even to put a halt to the enemy’s auxiliary
actions in support of his land and sea operations, leaving
him powerless to do much of anything. Such offensive
actions can not only cut off an opponent’s army and navy
from their bases of operations, but can also bomb the inte-
rior of the enemy’s country so devastatingly that the physi-
cal and moral resistance of the people would also collapse.
…
To conquer the command of the air means victory; to
be beaten in the air means defeat and acceptance of what-
ever terms the enemy may be pleased to impose. …
From this axiom we come immediately to this first
corollary: In order to assure an adequate national defense,
it is necessary – and sufficient – to be in a position in case
of war to conquer the command of the air. And from that
we arrive at this second corollary: All that a nation does to
assure her own defense should have as its aim procuring
for herself those means which, in case of war, are most
effective for the conquest of the command of the air. …
Any diversion from this primary purpose is an error.
In order to conquer the air, it is necessary to deprive the
enemy of all means of flying, by striking at him in the air,
at his bases of operation, or at his production centers – in
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short, wherever those means are to be found. This kind of
destruction can be accomplished only by aerial means, to
the exclusion of army and navy weapons. …
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes
in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt
themselves after the changes occur. In this period of rapid
transition from one form to another, those who daringly
take to the new road first will enjoy the incalculable ad-
vantages of the new means of war over the old. This new
character of war, emphasizing the advantages of the offen-
sive, will surely make for swift, crushing decisions on the
battlefield. … Those who are ready first not only will win
quickly, but will win with the fewest sacrifices and the
minimum expenditure of means.
From Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, translated by
Dino Ferrari (New York, 1942; reprinted Washington, 1983) 24-
30.
